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I. INTRODUCTION
Partially as a result of today's exceedingly liberal credit practices, the
judgment creditor is more and more often finding himself with a judgment
and no apparent means by which it may be satisfied. He may perhaps be
reminded of the old cliche that "one cannot squeeze blood out of a turnip."
If this is the case, and the judgment debtor really has no financial re-
sources, the judgment creditor may indeed have to bide his time until his
debtor again comes into means. However, with disturbingly increasing fre-
quency, it often seems that the debtor had property prior to the judgment
but has somehow or other caused it to disappear. When this happens, the
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor in Freshman
Research and Writing.
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property of the judgment debtor is normally either out of reach of the
creditor's writ of execution, or its existence and location may be unknown
to the creditor. At this point, the judgment creditor may have to return to
court for additional help in satisfying his judgment.
One remedy which is available to those faced with the above dilemma
is to institute a proceeding supplementary to and in aid of execution. It
will be the purpose of this article to outline the nature, scope and use of
such supplementary proceedings in aid of execution. An attempt will be
made to demonstrate how the proceedings are used both in general and in
particular situations. After an in depth analysis of these proceedings,
comments and recommended changes will be made by way of conclusion.
The approach to be used in fulfilling the above purpose involves a two
step process. First, the reader will be presented with a brief synopsis of
the process of collection pursuant to a writ of execution. This will be done
for the purpose of illustrating the limitations upon collection by way of
the ordinary writ of execution and without the aid of supplementary pro-
ceedings. Once the background information on the execution process has
been presented, the second and major phase of this article will begin. Pro-
ceedings supplementary to execution will be examined with a view towards
defining their nature and scope as well as diagraming the step-by-step
procedure used in implementing this remedy. The effectiveness of the
proceedings in particular cases will be analyzed and conclusions ultimately
will be reached with respect to suggestions for improvement.
At this point, the reader's attention should be directed to the fact
that there are several fine articles on supplementary proceedings in
Florida.' Despite the existence of this material, it is submitted that this
further treatment of the subject is warranted. Since the date of the most
recent article on supplementary proceedings, the statutes with respect
thereto have been amended and consolidated into one section.2 Further-
more, there appears to be some conflict in the case law.
Since the scope of this article has been narrowed to an in depth study
of supplementary proceedings, other writs and remedies, which concern
themselves with such problems as execution against non-monetary de-
crees, certain equitable interests not reachable by supplementary pro-
ceedings, and protection prior to judgment will not be discussed in this
article. In the event that the reader needs information concerning collec-
tion procedures other than supplementary proceedings, he should consult
the various other collection writs which are: assistance, 8 sequestration,4
1. FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION Div., FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE AFrm
TRIAL §§ 3.24-3.43 (1966) ; 13 FLA. JuR. Executions §§ 133-46 (1957); Note, Florida
Procedure in Satisfying or Avoiding a Money Judgment, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 269 (1964).
2. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, § 11, at 594, amending, FLA. STAT. §§ 55.52-55.611
(1965).
3. These writs are used by courts of equity to enforce decrees which order the con-
veyance of real property.
4. This writ may be used in certain cases to enforce equitable decrees and also to place
property into the custody of the court during the course of equitable litigation.
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attachment,5 garnishment,6 creditor's bills,7 ne exeat, possession,9 and
notice of lis pendens.'0
II. COLLECTION BY WRIT OF EXECUTION
A. General Aspects of the Execution Process
Broadly speaking, execution is the process, ancillary to an action,
whereby the final judgment or decree of the court is carried into effect."
The actual process is symbolized by a writ which is issued to an officer,
authorizing and directing him to enforce the judgment of the court.'
Today, both legal judgments and equitable decrees are enforceable by a
"writ of execution," provided that the equitable decree has been reduced
to a money payment.'5
The threshold problem encountered while studying the law of col-
lection is the loose and somewhat confusing usage of the word "execu-
tion." The term execution is often used by the courts to define any process
which carries into effect the judgment or decree of the court.' 4 However,
when used specifically, i.e., "writ of execution," the term is used to desig-
nate the writ of fieri facias which is the ordinary writ issued for the en-
forcement of a money judgment.'5 Another writ often used in conjunction
with fieri facias is the writ of scire facias which currently has as its prin-
cipal function the revival of a dormant judgment so that a "writ of execu-
tion" (fieri facias) may be issued thereon.' 6 Today there is little need for
scire facias since the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide that any
relief obtainable by scire facias may also be granted on motion after
notice.'
5. Attachment is primarily concerned with the taking into custody of real and personal
property in the debtor's possession prior to the rendition of judgment. Attachment results in
the acquisition of a lien.
6. Garnishment proceedings are generally used to conditionally subrogate the garnishor to
the rights of his debtor in personal property, or indebtedness, in the possession of or owed by
a third party, pending the entry of judgment.
7. A creditor's bill is a suit brought in equity to satisfy a judgment for an indebtedness
where there is no adequate remedy at law. The creditor's suit may be commenced prior to
judgment, but after filing. All property not otherwise exempt is subject to this bill.
8. This writ authorizes the arrest and imprisonment of a debtor who is about to flee the
jurisdiction of the court. It is commonly used to secure bond to insure the payment of
alimony and bastardy support decrees.
9. A writ issued by a court of law used to transfer the possession of land.
10. Notice of lis pendens operates with respect to property involved in a suit and serves
to notify prospective purchasers and encumbrancers that any interest they may acquire in
that property will be subject to the final judgment in the case.
11. 21 AM. JuR. Executions § 2 (1939).
12. Raulerson v. Peeples, 81 Fla. 206, 87 So. 629 (1921).
13. FIA. R. Civ. P. 1.570.
14. Raulerson v. Peeples, 81 Fla. 206, 87 So. 629 (1921).
15. Evins v. Gainesville Nat. Bank, 80 Fla. 84, 85 So. 659 (1920); Pasco v. Harley, 73
Fla. 819, 75 So. 30 (1917).
16. McCallum v. Gornto, 127 Fla. 792, 174 So. 24 (1937). This writ will be discussed in
detail in § II-C, p. 599 inlra.
17. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(d).
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B. Requirements for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution"
No execution can issue unless there is a judgment in terms of money
or a decree in equity for money payments. 19 For this reason, a default
judgment, which quite often does not specify the amount of damages, 0
will not support the issuance of a writ of execution.
Another limitation placed upon the writ of execution is that it may
only issue upon a final judgment.21 For the purposes of execution, a final
judgment is one which disposes of the entire merits of the cause and de-
termines whether the claimant is entitled to any recovery.22 Furthermore,
since the rendition of a judgment or decree is a judicial act,23 requiring
reduction to writing and signature by the judge,2 4 a mere confession of
judgment will not support the issuance of a "writ of execution."2 5
One of the formalities which must be observed prior to the issuance
of a "writ of execution" is the entry of a final judgment. The issuance of
the writ requires an entry into the court record of the judgment upon
which the writ has been issued. A failure to enter the judgment makes the
writ voidable but not void." Any "writ of execution" issued upon a judg-
ment which has not been entered may be validated by properly entering
the judgment in the record book.27 In this regard, it should be noted that
any judgment subject to collateral attack is void and any writ of execu-
tion issued thereon is also void.2 8 But the mere failure to enter a final
judgment into the record book does not make the judgment subject to
collateral attack so long as rendition is shown by the progress docket in
the cause.29
C. Time Limitations
Since a "writ of execution" needs the support of a valid judgment, it
follows that the writ may not be issued beyond the life of the judgment.8 0
18. The common law term of flie facias, which is often used interchangeably with
"writ of execution" will be dropped at this point since the right to execution on a judgment
is, in this state, a statutory one; cf. FLA. STAT. § 56.021 (1969).
19. Pan American Surety Co. v. St. Ana, 105 So.2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
20. For instance, the defendant has the right to contest the issue of unliquidated
damages, therefore a default judgment involving such an issue will not be a money judgment.
E.g., White v. Crandall, 105 Fla. 70, 137 So. 272 (1931).
21. E.g., Davidson v. Seegar, 15 Fla. 671 (1876).
22. Irving Trust Co. v. Kaplan, 155 Fla. 120, 20 So.2d 351 (1944).
23. Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106 (1930) (criminal case).
24. FLA. R. App. P. 1.3.
25. Therefore, in order to have execution, the party must bring an action on the con-
fession of judgment. First Nat'l. Bank v. Brown, 119 Fla. 761, 162 So. 142 (1935). Today
such an action on a domestic judgment may be barred by statute. See FLA. STAT. § 55.05
(1969).
26. Adams v. Higgins, 23 Fla. 13, 1 So. 321 (1887).
27. Id.
28. Brauer v. Paddock, 103 Fla. 1175, 139 So. 146 (1932).
29. FLA. STAT. § 55.07 (1969).
30. Cf. Spurway v. Dyer, 48 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fla. 1942). See also FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.550 (a).
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Therefore, the absolute limitation placed upon the execution of any given
judgment will be provided for by the statute of limitations applicable to
judgments of the rendering court. Judgments of any Florida state court
of record have a life of 20 years. 1 When the judgment is one rendered by
a justice of the peace its life is 11 years. 32 If the judgment is one of a
foreign court, an action thereon will be barred after 7 years provided, how-
ever, that the judgment debtor has been within the jurisdiction of the State
of Florida during the 7 years subsequent to judgment." It appears that
the above-mentioned periods commence running at the rendition, rather
than the entry of the judgment.8 In any event, it should be recalled that
an action on the judgment creates another judgment which will begin
anew the running of the statute of limitations.
As previously indicated, the absolute time limitation placed upon
the issuance of a "writ of execution" is the period of the statute of limita-
tions with respect to the underlying judgment. This, however, is not the
only time limitation. A judgment may become dormant during this period
for one of several reasons. If a judgment becomes dormant, it will not
support the issuance of a "writ of execution" until it has been properly re-
vived. At common law, a judgment became dormant one year and a day
after rendition and thereafter would not support the issuance of a "writ
of execution. 35 Until 1967, Florida Statute section 55.15 (1965) had
extended this period to three years 6 after which time the judgment be-
came dormant and had to be revived by a writ of scire facias.87
With the repeal of Florida Statute section 55.15 (1965),88 there now
seems to be some doubt as to what the law is with respect to the dormancy
of judgments. Does the lack of a specified statutory dormancy period
mean that the common law period of one year and a day is once again ap-
plicable? 9 Or, does the absence of such a period indicate that, in Florida,
judgments no longer become dormant?40 It is submitted that there is no
clear answer to these questions as there are logical arguments in support
of either view. One could take the position that since the rules of procedure
were modified in 1962 to allow any relief available by scire facias to be
31. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(1) (1969).
32. Viggio v. Wood, 101 So.2d 922 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
33. Van Deren v. Lory, 87 Fla. 422, 100 So. 794 (1924), interpreting REv. GEN. STAT. §
2939(2) (1920) now FLA. STAT. § 95.11(2) (1967).
34. Cf. Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374, 100 So. 170 (1924). This appears
to be the most logical approach since the alternative, of waiting until "entry" to commence
the running of the time period, could allow the judgment creditor to prolong the period by
causing the judgment not to be recorded.
35. Spurway v. Dyer, 48 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fla. 1942).
36. FLA. STAT. § 55.15 (1965). This statute has since been repealed and the period during
which a judgment, without scire facias, will support an execution, does not now appear to be
specifically covered by statute.
37. Id.
38. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, § 49.
39. Cf. Spurway v. Dyer, 48 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fla. 1942).
40. Cf. FA. STAT. § 56.021 (1969).
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granted upon motion after notice without the issuance of a writ of scire
facias,4' the legislature could have intended that their repeal of the three-
year dormancy statute operate to revive the one-year common law period
because the revival by motion practice would be simple and no hardship
would accrue. On the other hand, there appears to be a more persuasive
argument to the effect that the legislature intended to do away with dor-
mancy entirely when it repealed Florida Statute section 55.15 (1965).
This theory can be based upon a comparison of the language of the earlier
statutes and that of the section which has taken its place. The original
section provided as follows:
The plaintiff shall be entitled to his execution at any time within
three years after the rendition of any judgment or decree, and
upon the issuance of his execution, shall be entitled to renew the
same upon the return to the clerk's office of the original execu-
tion, from time to time for twenty years, unless the same be
sooner satisfied.42
In the act that repealed the above section, the reviser's notes provided that
section 55.15 was repealed and the subject matter contained therein would
now be covered by section 56.021 which provides as follows:
When issued, an execution is valid and effective during the life of
the judgment or decree on which it is issued. When fully paid,
the officer executing it shall make his return and file it in the
court which issued the execution. If the execution is lost or de-
stroyed, the party entitled thereto may have an alias, pluries or
other copies on making proof of such loss or destruction by affi-
davit and filing it in the court issuing the execution.4
Since the only time limitation apparently provided by this section is that
an execution will only be valid and effective during the life of the judg-
ment or decree on which it is issued, it can be argued that a judgment no
longer becomes dormant and will support the issuance of a "writ of execu-
tion" during its entire lifetime without any need for revival. This position
becomes especially persuasive when viewed in the light of the facts that
the reviser's notes were specifically made a part of the act which re-
pealed the earlier dormancy statute.44 Consequently, it appears to this
author that it is quite probable that a judgment no longer becomes dor-
mant in Florida for the purposes of the issuance of a writ of execution.
The passage of time has not always been the only incident which has
caused a judgment to become dormant. For instance, in many states the
death of the judgment debtor prior to the issuance of an execution neces-
sitated a revival of the judgment, by scire jacias, against either the per-
41. FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.100(d).
42. FLA. STAT. § 55.15 (1965); repealed, Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254 § 49.
43. FLA. STAT. § 56.021 (1969).
44. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, § 52.
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sonal representative, in the case of personal property, or the heirs, in the
case of realty.45 In Florida, however, the rule is that the judgment creditor
may not have execution issue after the death of the debtor. Such a judg-
ment must be filed in the same manner as other claims against the de-
cedent's estate. 46
D. Formalities
The writ of execution is issued by the clerk of the court upon the
motion of the judgment creditor. 47 This motion may-be by oral request4 8
and the writ, when issued, is enforceable anywhere in the state.49 Gen-
erally speaking, the writ should contain an order to the sheriff requiring
him to enforce the judgment by levy and sale.50 It must also bear the date
of issuance5' and be designated as returnable upon satisfaction.52 Any
defect in the writ which may be cured by an amendment thereto will not
invalidate the proceedings thereunder.5"
E. Property Subject to a Writ of Execution
One of the most stringent limitations placed upon the writ of execu-
tion is the property which it may lawfully reach. Florida Statute section
56.061 (1969) provides that the lands, tenements, goods, chattels, and
equities of redemption in real 4 and personal5 property belonging to the
judgment debtor are subject to a writ of execution. Although this list of
property seems extensive, it should be recalled that the property must
be in the possession of the judgment debtor. There is an exception to this
rule to the effect that property belonging to the judgment debtor which
was fraudulently transferred and is in the possession of a third party may
be made subject to a levy pursuant to the writ of execution. However, as
the Florida Supreme Court has pointed out,56 this practice is extremely
dangerous for it may cause the judgment creditor to become liable for
wrongful execution if it develops that the transfer cannot be shown to
45. See, e.g., Dougherty v. White, 112 Neb. 675, 200 N.W. 884 (1924).
46. O'Flarity v. Gurley, 22 Fla. Supp. 196 (Duval Co. Cir. Ct. 1964).
47. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.160. Presumably this means the court in which the judgment was
rendered; cf., 21 Am. JUR. Executions § 28 (1939).
48. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.550(a).
49. FLA. STAT. § 56.031 (1969). The writ itself is directed to any and all sheriffs of the
state. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. FLA. STAT. § 56.041 (1969).
53. Adams v. Higgins, 23 Fla. 13, 1 So. 321 (1887).
54. On motion by the judgment creditor, the court will order a hearing to determine the
interest of the judgment debtor in the equity of redemption. FLA. STAT. § 56.071 (1967).
55. A bond must be posted by the purchaser at the execution sale equal to twice the
sheriff's evaluation of the property so sold. FLA. STAT. § 56.08 (1967). Bond is for the pro-
tection of the mortgage.
56. Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. 836 (1935)..
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have been fraudulent.5 7 It is because the writ of execution is practically
exercisable only against property in the possession of the debtor, and only
with respect to certain kinds of property, that the additional remedies
such as garnishment, creditor's bills and supplementary proceedings are
necessary.
F. Levy Under a Writ of Execution
Another problem incident to the execution process, which is not en-
tirely solved by the other remedies such as supplementary proceedings, is
the practical difficulty of bringing about a levy under the writ. "A levy
of execution has been defined as an absolute appropriation in law of the
property levied on to the payment of the judgment debt. '5 8 The property
so appropriated is later sold and the proceeds used to satisfy the judgment.
By statute, execution may be levied by sheriffs,5 9 their deputies, and, if
the writ issued from a justice of the peace court, the constable of the
county. 60 Levy requires an interference, by the execution officer, with the
possession of the property in such a manner that he would be amenable to
an action for trespass were it not for the protection afforded him by the
writ.6 ' Once property has been levied upon, it is in custodia legis 2 and
may not be taken by another execution in the hands of some other officer.6 8
Naturally, special problems arise where the interest levied upon is not in
the form of tangible property. These situations are in part covered by
statutes and sometimes require special orders from the court issuing the
execution. It occasionally happens that the sheriff will receive several writs
running in favor of different judgment creditors, each of which is to be
executed against the same judgment debtor. When two or more writs are
delivered to the sheriff or his deputies, he should make his levy pursuant
to the first writ received. 4 In the event that a subsequently delivered
writ is levied upon first, the property is bound by that sale in favor of that
writ,65 and the party whose writ was first delivered must seek relief from
the sheriff to the extent that he is damaged.66
G. Execution Sales
Following the levy of execution, there must be a sale of the property
levied upon. Of primary importance regarding sales is the requirement of
57. Id. at 741-42, 164 So. at 840.
58. 21 Am. JuR., Executions § 94 (1939).
59. FLA. STAT. § 56.031 (1969).
60. FLA. STAT. § 37.18 (1969).
61. 21 Am. JuR. Executions § 107 (1939).
62. Hooker v. Wiggins, 104 Fla. 355, 139 So. 803 (1932).
63. Adams v. Burns, 126 Fla. 685, 172 So. 75 (1936).
64. Love v. Williams, 4 Fla. 126 (1851).
65. Id.
66. Albrecht v. Long, 25 Minn. 163 (1878).
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public notice. 7 All such sales must take place between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m.
on a weekday 68 and should be conducted in the courthouse in the county
wherein the property was levied upon, or, if inconvenient, at the place of
levy. 9 The general rule seems to be that, in order to protect the judgment
debtor, the sheriff may only sell pursuant to the writ under which he ad-
vertised70 and, where the property is divisible, no more should be sold
than necessary to satisfy the judgment.7 '
H. Execution Against Personal Property
In Florida, the writ of execution creates a lien on all property of the
judgment debtor which can be subject to levy and sale thereunder.72 This
lien commences or becomes effective at the time the writ of execution is
delivered to the sheriff73 and should be carefully distinguished from
the "judgment lien" which applies only to certain real property.74 With
respect to the execution lien, the writ first delivered to the sheriff has
priority over subsequently acquired execution liens, even when the first
has not been levied upon while the others have.7" Generally speaking, this
lien also prevails over subsequent dispositions of the property, 6 but, as
to prior liens and other forms of security interests, it is dangerous to
generalize.
In some cases, because of the nature of the property involved, it
becomes exceedingly difficult to determine what action by the sheriff
constitutes a proper levy of execution. Because the time of levy indicates
when the lien arises, this problem is of paramount significance. Also, be-
cause some property in certain situations was beyond the reach of execu-
tion at common law, special rules have arisen which govern the right to, or
the manner of, levying upon certain forms of personal property. To levy
67. FLA. STAT. § 56.21 (1969).
68. FLA. STAT. § 56.22 (1969).
69. FLA. STAT. § 56.23 (1969).
70. Griggs v. Miller, 374 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1963). This rule puts the debtor on notice
as to how much of his property must be sold and prevents surprises.
71. Id. In addition, the defendant in execution may obtain the release of any property
held by the sheriff by substituting property of an equal or greater value. FLA. STAT. § 56.11
(1969).
72. United States v. Gurley, 415 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1969). This includes all realty, goods,
chattels, corporate stock, etc., described therein, but not contractual rights or choses in
action such as bank accounts or bad debts. Willar v. Petruska, 402 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1968).
73. E.g., Black v. Miller, 219 So.2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
74. FLA. STAT. § 55.10 (1969) provides that:
Judgments and decrees become a lien on real estate in the county where rendered
when the judgment or decree is recorded in the proper record of such county and in
other counties when a certified copy thereof is recorded in the proper record of other
counties.
75. This is the case even where the subsequently delivered writs describe specifically the
property mentioned in the prior unexecuted writ. [1959-1960] FLA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNiAL
REP. 660.
76. See Love v. Williams, 4 Fla. 126 (1851); Black v. Miller, 219 So.2d 106 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1969); Nason v. Polo Water Co., 166 So.2d 691 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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on corporate stock, the sheriff must exhibit to the transfer agent a copy
of the writ of execution and inform him that a levy is thereby made upon
the judgment debtor's shares.17 Equities of redemption, which by statute
are subject to execution, require the use of a special procedure subsequent
to levy and prior to sale. The procedure is designed to aid in determining
the mortgagor's interest in the property, or more precisely, to protect the
mortgagee and purchasers at the execution sale.7" This procedure amounts
to a hearing which is commenced upon the motion of the levying party.70
The interest of a copartner in partnership properties is also subject to a
writ of execution pursuant to a judgment against the partner individually. 0
When the partnership itself is the judgment debtor, a writ of execution
may be levied against the entity, or its individual partners, or any one
of them."1 Even a corporate franchise, which ordinarily is considered an
intangible, has been subject to a writ of execution in at least two early
cases."2 Of course, the foregoing cannot attempt to be an all inclusive list
of the various types of personal property which present difficulty to the
levying sheriff. They are mentioned at this point only by way of illustra-
tion of the various stumbling blocks in the execution process.
I. Execution Against Real Property
Under Florida law, judgments and decrees, when properly recorded,
create a lien against all real property of the judgment debtor."3 However,
no judgment will become a lien on real property of the judgment debtor
until it has been rendered and entered into the record book of the county
in which the land is situated. 4 The recording of the original judgment or
decree does not satisfy the statute; rather, a certified transcript thereof
must be filed in the judgment lien recordbook s5 This judgment lien is then
77. It should be noted that the statute which specifically authorized this procedure was
repealed effective June 26, 1967. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-254, § 1. The same legislature, how-
ever, specifically provided that corporate stock shall be subject to levy and sale under
execution. FLA. STAT. § 56.061 (1967). According to this section levy shall be made "on such
personal property."
78. Cf. Mitchell v. Maxwell, 2 Fla. 594 (1849).
79. FLA. STAT. § 56.071 (1969).
80. B.A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 308, 14 So.2d 669 (1943). Levy and sale under
this execution has the effect of dissolving the partnership and the proceeds, less partnership
liabilities, go to the judgment creditor to the extent of his debtor's interest therein.
81. State ex. rel Clower v. Sweat, 120 Fla. 312, 162 So. 689 (1935).
82. Leonard v. Baylen Street Wharf Co., 59 Fla. 547, 52 So. 718 (1910); cf. Holland
v. State, 15 Fla. 455 (1876).
83. FLA. STAT. § 55.10 (1969). But apparently only judgments and decrees which are
for the payment of money will create such a lien. [1949-1950] FLA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENN1AL.
REP. 35. But cf., Nassau Realty Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 147 Fla. 754, 198 So. 581 (1940),
holding that suits to enforce or foreclose on earlier liens merge the earlier lien into a
judgment lien.
84. FLA. STAT. § 55.10 (1969); Bond-Howell Lumber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 200 So.2d
555 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
85. [1967-1968] FLA. A-r'y GEN. BIENmAL REP. 142.
605 ,
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effective for the life of the judgment. 6 During the period of the lien, all
after acquired real property also becomes subject thereto. 7
As in the case of personal property, not all interests of the judgment
debtor in real property can be made subject to the judgment lien. To begin,
the judgment debtor must have legal title to the real property.88 However,
the lien only attaches to the extent of the judgment debtor's beneficial in-
terest in the property to which he has a legal title.89 Therefore, a mere
trustee has no interest to which a judgment lien may attach. In the case
of a partnership or co-tenancy, a judgment against either partner or co-
tenant establishes a lien against his respective interest in the lands of the
co-tenancy or partnership.91
The priority of the judgment lien, as in the case of the execution lien,
is beyond the scope of this article. Execution is discussed at this point only
for the purposes of providing a background to proceedings supplementary
to execution. Only a few generalizations are required with respect to
priorities. As between successive judgments against the same debtor, the
prior in time creates a superior lien against the real property of the judg-
ment debtor. 2 This is true even where the later judgment is first exe-
cuted. On the other hand, the priority question with respect to the judg-
ment lien versus other forms of interest in the debtor's property does not
admit of such well defined rules. The statutes concerning security interests
in fixtures, the priority of tax liens, and other applicable statutes should
be consulted in every case.
J. Summary of Execution
Up to this point some aspects of the process of executing a money
judgment have been outlined. No attempt has been made to deal with all
the details surrounding the process of collection by writ of execution,
as the purpose of this article is to analyze supplementary proceedings.
The foregoing brief discussion of collection by writ of execution should
be sufficient to appraise the reader of the many difficulties inherent in col-
lection by this means. Since the writ is not available against choses in
action, contractual rights or other mere equitable interests,94 and is fur-
ther limited by the need for possession and the problems inherent in levy-
ing the writ, it should by now be obvious that the judgment creditor may
86. FLA. STAT. § 55.081 (1969); Giddins v. McFarlan, 152 Fla. 281, 10 So.2d 807 (1943).
87. B.A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 304, 14 So.2d 667 (1943).
88. United States v. Cohen, 271 F. Supp. 709 (S.D. Fla. 1967); Cheves v. First Nat'l
Bank, 79 Fla. 34, 83 So. 870 (1920). This would seem to preclude the judgment creditor
from acquiring a judgment lien on a mere leasehold since in most states it is considered an
equitable interest. Cf. Summerville v. Stockton Milling Co., 142 Cal. 529, 76 P. 243 (1904).
89. Arundel Debenture Corp. v. Le Blond, 139 Fla. 668, 190 So. 765 (1939).
90. First Nat'l Bank v. Savarese, 101 Fla. 480, 134 So. 501 (1931).
91. Eldridge v. Post, 20 Fla. 579 (1884).
92. Dunham & Co. v. Post, 20 Fla. 579 (1884); Love v. Williams, 4 Fla. 126 (1851).
93. Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374, 100 So. 170 (1924).
94. E.g., Peninsula State Bank v. United States, 211 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1968).
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quite often find himself in need of an additional collection device. The re-
mainder of this article will examine in detail one of these devices, supple-
mentary proceedings in aid of execution.
III. SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS IN Am oF EXECUTION
A. The Nature and Purpose of Supplementary Proceedings
1. IN GENERAL
Supplementary proceedings were unknown to the common law and
were first provided by the legislature in 1919.95 Later, in 1927, these sec-
tions were renumbered and became a part of the Compiled General Laws
of Florida.96 Eventually the sections providing for supplementary pro-
ceedings became a part of the Florida Statutes and remained substan-
tially unchanged from their original form up and through 1961. 91 In 1963,
the Statutes with respect to these proceedings were amended by adding an
additional section which provided for the taxing of costsY8 The only
material change in the entire history of these sections came in 1967 when
the legislature combined them all into one section and substantially altered
the language of some of their provisions. 9
Before examining the operation and effect of supplementary pro-
ceedings, it seems appropriate to determine the purpose which the legis-
lature sought to accomplish by enacting these sections. In this regard, it
is clear
that the fundamental purpose behind the act [was] to assist
judgment creditors to discover any assets the defendant may
have that can be appropriated to the payment of the execution,
and that it is a new and additional means to make effective the
process of the law, when a judgment has been secured and a
fruitless effort has been made to satisfy it.'
The Florida Supreme Court has stated that:
These statutes were designed to assist judgment creditors to dis-
cover any assets of the defendant that could be appropriated to
satisfy the judgment, thereby furnishing additional means of
satisfying executions after they have been returned unsatisfied.'
95. Fla. Laws 1919, ch. 7842.
96. ComP. Ga. LAWS oF FLA., §§ 4540-49 (1927).
97. FLA. STAT. §§ 55.52-.61 (1961).
98. FLA. STAT. § 55.611 (1969) ; added by, Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-144, § 1.
99. The change was implemented by Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, § 11. Today, all of
the provisions providing for supplementary proceedings in aid of execution are contained
in FLA. STAT. § 56.29 (1969).
100. South Florida Trust Co. v. Miami Coliseum Corp., 101 Fla. 1351, 1355, 133 So.
334, 336 (1931) ; accord, Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. 836 (1935).
101. Ryan's Furniture Exch. Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 117, 162 So. 483, 486 (1935).
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In a later opinion, the same court opined that:
[T]he purpose of the statutes, titled "proceedings supplemen-
tary," is to aid the holder of a "valid and outstanding" execu-
tion to ferret out what assets the judgment debtor may have or
what-property of his others may be holding for him, or may have
received from him to defeat the collection of the lien or claim,
that might be subject to the execution. Such proceedings are not
necessary to bring new life to the judgment itself or the lien of
the judgment, and seem to bear no direct relation to it. They are
in the nature of proceedings in discovery of property which
should be made available to the execution. As we see it, they
relate directly to the execution and are designed to aid in deter-
mining through judicial process what property the defendant
may have or others may have for him that could be subjected to
the execution;... 102
As the foregoing language indicates, supplementary proceedings are a
collection device which operate to enhance the effectiveness of the writ of
execution. The proceedings have been regarded as a substitute for a
creditor's bill in chancery,' but the Florida courts have not as yet held
that the jurisdiction of the circuit court in such cases has become co-
extensive with the jurisdiction of the circuit court in the chancery
cases.104 In sum, the legislature, in creating proceedings supplementary to
execution, intended to create an expeditious remedy for the enforcement
of money judgments which would be separate and distinct from the credi-
tor's bill in equity.
2. MORE THAN JUST A DISCOVERY DEVICE
These proceedings do more than simply seek out property which may
be applied to the satisfaction of the execution. When carried to their
proper conclusion, they can result in a judgment against third persons who
hold property belong to the debtor. This judgment, in turn, is made sub-
ject to the writ of execution and the judgment debtor thereby receives
satisfaction of the original judgment. Proceedings supplementary to exe-
cution should not be confused with discovery in aid of execution which is
a process permitted by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.0 5 The dis-
covery process may be commenced any time after the entry of judgment
and does not require the return of an unsatisfid execution in order to im-
plement the proceedings. However, the discovery process does not have
102. Young v. McKenzie, 46 So.2d 184, 185 (Fla. 1950).
103. Reese v. Baker, 98 Fla. 52, 123 So. 3 (1929).
104. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp. v. Smith, 121 Fla. 720, 164 So. 717 (1935) (opinion
amended as to other matters on rehearing).
105. In aid of a judgment, decree or execution the judgment creditor or his successor
in interest, when that interest appears of record, may examine any person, including
the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules for taking depositions.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.560.
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the teeth of supplementary proceedings for it operates only as a discovery
device and no orders are made by the court requiring persons to produce
property or show cause why the property should not be produced. On the
other hand, in supplementary proceedings, the judge may order third
parties to pay the judgment creditor's judgment and this order may be
enforced through the court's power of contempt. The discovery procedure
provided by the Florida Rules is a flexible and inexpensive supplement to
supplementary proceedings but it does not operate to supplant these pro-
ceedings." °" In this connection, the judgment creditor might find it con-
venient to resort first to the discovery procedure for the purposes of
determining whether any third persons hold property belonging to the
debtor. Once this information is obtained, and it is determined that the
third parties refuse to allow the property to be applied to the judgment
creditor's judgment, he may then commence supplementary proceedings
in aid of execution.
3. NATURE OF THE REMEDY
In discussing the nature of the relief provided by supplementary pro-
ceedings, one of the threshold inquiries is whether the remedy is legal or
equitable. An answer to this question has more effect than the mere satis-
faction of academic curiosity. If supplementary proceedings were to be
considered equitable in nature, this could give rise to the requirement that
judgment creditors, before they may resort to this remedy, must exhaust
their means of relief at law. Furthermore, the right to a jury trial in such
proceedings might then be non-existent.
It seems clear to this writer that the relief provided by Florida
Statute section 56.29 (1969) is legal and not equitable. Research has dis-
closed only one decision which casts any doubt upon this conclusion. In
Gantz v. First National Bank of Miami,"°7 the following dicta ap-
pears:
The only time that resort to a court of equity to enforce a com-
mon law judgment is permitted is when the remedies provided
for the satisfaction of such judgment have been exhausted, are
inadequate, or are of no avail. The judgment creditor then has
recourse to supplementary proceedings provided by statute or a
creditor's bill to reach equitable interests not subject to levy of
execution.10
Despite the existence of the above language, it is submitted that supple-
mentary proceedings are legal in nature. Authority for this position can be
found in the case of South Florida Trust Co. v. Miami Coliseum Corp.,0 9
106. Wilde v. Wilde, 237 So.2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
107. 138 So.2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
108. d. at 368 (emphasis added).
109. 101 Fla. 1351, 133 So. 334 (1931).
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which dealt indirectly with the character of the remedy provided by the
supplementary proceedings statutes. In the South Florida case, the de-
fendant in supplementary proceedings alleged that the remedy provided
thereby was violative of the Florida Constitution in that the supple-
mentary proceedings statutes gave the power to discover assets to the law
courts. This power, the defendant asserted, was equitable in nature and,
therefore, the statutes were violative of that section of the Constitution
which provides that the circuit courts shall have exclusive original juris-
diction in equity. In response to this argument, the Florida Supreme Court
stated that "it may be truly said, an examination of a judgment debtor is
merely a matter of procedure not necessarily involving any equitable rights
as such.""n0
Another case containing language which indicates that supplementary
proceedings are a legal remedy is Orange Belt Packing Co. v. International
Agricultural Corp.,"' which involved an appeal from both the final judg-
ment in the main action and the final judgment in the supplementary
proceedings. The Florida Supreme Court referred to both of these
judgments as "two separate and distinct final judgments at law, . .."I"
To the same effect is the case of George E. Sebring Co. v. O'Rourke,
which referred to the statutory proceedings as providing "a specific
remedy at law. . . ...13 In view of the statements found in the above
mentioned decisions, as well as other authorities," 4 it appears safe to
conclude that Florida Statute section 56.29 (1969) provides the judg-
ment creditor with a legal remedy.
Another aspect of supplementary proceedings which deserves cover-
age at this time is the fact that the proceedings are entirely statutory. 15
Furthermore, although supplementary proceedings are a legal cause sepa-
arate from the main suit," 6 they are also collateral thereto," 7 and do not
constitute an independent suit."'
Having outlined the general nature of supplementary proceedings,
attention may now be turned to an examination of the conditions precedent
to the use of the remedy.
110. Id. at 1358, 133 So. at 337.
111. 112 Fla. 99, 150 So. 264 (1933).
112. Id. at 103, 150 So. at 265.
113. 101 Fla. 885, 898, 134 So. 556, 561 (1931).
114. E.g., Bennett v. Bogue, 88 Fla. 109, 101 So. 206 (1924); Note, Civil Procedure:
Running of Limitation Period Not Tolled by Supplementary Proceedings, 4 U. FLA. L. REV.
96 (1951).
115. Street v. Sugarman, 177 So.2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
116. Orange Belt Packing Co. v. International Agricultural Corp., 112 Fla. 99, 150 So.
264 (1933).
117. Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1956).
118. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp. v. Smith, 121 Fla. 720, 164 So. 717 (1935).
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B. Conditions Precedent
1. UNSATISFIED WRIT OF EXECUTION
It is clear that one prerequisite to the relief provided by these pro-
ceedings is that the sheriff must hold a valid, outstanding and partially or
totally unsatisfied writ of execution." 9 To this requirement, there appear
to be no exceptions. However, although this condition seems simple enough
when taken at face value, there are several problems which lurk beneath
the surface.
For instance, since the execution writ must be valid and outstanding,
the question of a dormant judgment, discussed in section 2 supra, may
arise at this point. Of course, even if there is still such a thing as a dor-
mant judgment in Florida, this problem may be cured quite easily on
motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.100 (b). Neverthe-
less, the judgment creditor should be apprised of this possibility when pre-
paring to commence supplementary proceedings.
Another difficulty which may exist in this area arises from the recent
amendment of the statutes involved. The earlier versions provided that
once the execution had been returned unsatisfied, the proceedings could
be commenced "in the court from which such execution issued, ... M20
Today the corresponding provision provides merely that "[w]hen
any sheriff holds an unsatisfied execution, the plaintiff in execution may
file an affidavit so stating and that the execution is valid and outstanding
and thereupon is entitled to these proceedings supplementary to execu-
tion.'1 2' Nowhere in the current statute is there any indication that the
judgment creditor must commence the supplementary proceedings in the
same court from which the execution issued. Under this new statute, may
the judgment creditor commence his supplementary proceedings in a court
other than that which rendered the final judgment in the main cause?
Although research has disclosed no case directly dealing with this ques-
tion, it is submitted that the answer lies in the fact that the supplementary
proceedings are not a separate action upon a judgment, but, rather, a
collateral proceeding ancillary to the main cause. 22 Since this statute
section was "intended to empower the court to follow through with the
enforcement of its judgment,""' it would appear that despite the statutory
silence on this point, the judgment creditor must still commence his pro-
ceeding in the same court from which the writ of execution was issued.
119. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(1) (1969). The requirement that there be an unsatisfied return
of the execution of course implies that there must have been some form of a money judgment.
See, p. 599 supra.
120. FaA. STAT. § 55.52 (1963).
121. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(1) (1969).
122. Cf. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp. v. Smith, 121 Fla. 720, 164 So. 717 (1935).
123. Id. at 725, 164 So. at 719.
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Another uncertainty which has arisen as a result of the requirement
that an unsatisfied writ of execution be returned prior to the commence-
ment of supplementary proceedings is exemplified by the case of State ex
rel. All Florida Land Co. v. Thomas Manors, Inc.12 4 In this case, the
judgment debtor resided in a county different from the one in which the
court rendering the final judgment was located. Following the dictates of
the statute then in effect, 125 the trial judge ordered that the supplementary
proceedings be conducted by a commissioner located in the county of the
judgment debtor's residence. Subsequent to the appointment of the com-
missioner, the judgment debtor sought to arrest the proceedings through
the use of a writ of prohibition. He contended "that the appointment of
a commissioner to proceed under the terms of the act in [the county of
his residence] was ineffective prior to placing the execution in the hands
of the Sheriff of that County and having it returned unsatisfied." 26 The
Florida Supreme Court refused to accept this contention, holding that an
unsatisfied return in the county wherein the judgment was originally
rendered was sufficient to comport with the terms of the statute.
2. FILING THE AFFIDAVIT
Aside from the return of an unsatisfied execution, the only other
condition precedent to the institution of supplementary proceedings is
the filing of an affidavit. This affidavit must state that the sheriff holds an
unsatisfied, valid, and outstanding execution. Probably the only difficulty
surrounding this requirement is the question of who may execute the affi-
davit. Under the earlier statutes it was specifically provided that "the
plaintiff in execution, his agent or attorney, may make and file" the affi-
davit. 27 Today the corresponding section provides only that the plaintiff
in execution may file the affidavit. There is no indication as to whether the
plaintiff's attorney or his agent may still make the affidavit.
3. NO NEED TO EXHAUST LEGAL REMEDIES
Since supplementary proceedings are characterized as a remedy at
law, it is unnecessary for the judgment creditor to exhaust his legal reme-
dies prior to resorting to supplementary proceedings. This is quite the op-
posite of the rule with regard to creditor's bills in equity for in order to
be entitled to that remedy, the judgment creditor must first exhaust his
legal remedies including supplementary proceedings in aid of execution.
In contrast, it is evident from the case law that such a prerequisite does
not exist when one resorts to supplementary proceedings. For example,
124. 136 Fla. 207, 186 So. 421 (1939).
125. COMP. GEN. LAWS § 4540 (1927).
126. State ex rel. All Florida Land Co. v. Thomas Manors, Inc., 136 Fla. 207, 210, 186
So. 421, 422 (1939).
127. FLA. STAT. § 55.52 (1963).
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in General Guaranty Insurance Co. v. DaCosta,'128 the plaintiff in execu-
tion learned that his debtor carried liability insurance. He then com-
menced supplementary proceedings and impleaded the liability insurer.
Although the court found that the proceeds from the liability insurance
policy would clearly be subject to execution pursuant to a garnishment
judgment (a legal remedy), the court nevertheless allowed the judgment
creditor to implead the insurer over the insurer's objection that the pro-
cedure was improper. It seems clear that the exhaustion of legal remedies
is not a condition precedent to the institution of supplementary proceed-
ings in aid of execution. 2 9
C. Procedure
1. IN GENERAL
Upon the return of the unsatisfied writ of execution, the plaintiff in
execution may commence his supplementary proceeding.
To launch such procedure the "plaintiff in execution" files
in the court "from which such execution issued" an affidavit
merely stating that the writ is valid and outstanding, giving the
residence of the defendant. That sets the machinery in motion
which secures to him an examination of the defendant and, if the
circumstances warrant it, of others who have been involved in
gifts, transfers, or assignments of the defendant's property.
Upon the information so obtained, the judge may order such
property in the hands of the judgment debtor himself or others
as the evidence justifies to be applied toward the satisfaction
of the debt.
3 0
After filing the affidavit, the plaintiff moves the court to order the defen-
dant in execution to appear before it, a commissioner, or master at a time
and place specified by the order.13 1 After this, the order is served upon
the defendant and such other persons as are named in the affidavit. The
examination is then conducted with a view towards disclosing whether the
defendant in execution has any property which may be used to satisfy
the judgment. Once all the testimony is taken and it appears that there
is property subject to the judgment, either in the hands of the debtor or
some third person, the judge may order the property applied toward the
satisfaction of the judgment debt. If the property so discovered is in the
hands of the judgment debtor, no problem exists; he is already a party
128. 190 So.2d 211 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
129. But cf. Gantz v. Nat'l Bank, 138 So.2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
130. Young v. McKenzie, 46 So.2d 184, 185 (Fla. 1950), noted in 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 96
(1951).
131. As a practical matter, this is usually done in the affidavit. For excellent examples
of these affidavits, the reader should consult the following sources: FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION Div., FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE AFTER TRIAL § 3.29 (1966); A. SAPP,
FLORIDA PLEADING, PRACTICE AND LEGAL FoRMs § 56.29 (1971).
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to the proceedings. Therefore, if he does not comply with the order, he
may be punished for contempt. On the other hand, if the property is in the
hands of a third person, that person must be impleaded and made a party
to the supplementary proceedings so that the court's order will be binding
upon him. This is usually done by serving upon the third person a rule
to show cause why the property should not be taken and applied to the
satisfaction of the judgment. Once the third persons have been made
parties to the proceedings their rights may be finally adjudicated and the
sheriff may then levy execution upon the property if the court orders.
The only exception to this is provided in subsection 6(b) of Florida
Statute section 56.29 (1969). According to that subsection, if the judg-
ment creditor can make a prima facie showing that the debtor transferred
property with the intent to defraud the creditor, the court may order the
sheriff to levy upon the property and require the third person to then pro-
ceed pursuant to Florida Statute sections 56.16-56.20 (1969).112 This pro-
vision for levy in advance of a final determination of the third person's
rights has given rise to considerable confusion and misunderstanding.
In the exercise of the ample discretion granted by the statute, no
order directing the sheriff to take any property alleged to have
been fraudulently transferred should be made on the prima facie
showing contemplated by Section . . . [56.29 (6)(b)] unless
every person whose rights may be affected thereby, and who is
not already a party to the proceedings, be by said order im-
pleaded and made a party thereto and afforded by the terms of
said order full right to be heard and cited and directed to file
an answer setting up his claim to the property within a reason-
able time to be fixed by the order, a copy of which should be
served upon him. And in the exercise of that discretion no such
preliminary order should be made unless the judge be satisfied,
either by affidavit, or by other evidence before him, that the ap-
plication of the plaintiff therefor is well founded and made in
good faith, and in every proper case security should be required
for the protection of any third person who claims the title or pos-
session of any property ordered seized. 8
From the language quoted above, an omission in the statute suddenly
becomes apparent; i.e., the procedure for levy in advance of final determi-
nation provided by subsection 6(b) cannot be implemented until the third
person, in whose possession the property is to be found, has been im-
pleaded and made a party to the supplementary proceedings. Once this
has been done, and only after a convincing preliminary showing that the
debtor intended a fraudulent transfer, may the court order a levy in ad-
vance of the final determination as to whether the property should be ap-
132. The procedure set out in these sections is that which is normally applied when
third persons have claims to property which is levied upon pursuant to the ordinary writ
of execution.
133. Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 745, 164 So. 836, 841 (1935).
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plied to the satisfaction-of the debt. If all of the above conditions are met,
the court will order such a levy to be made and the property will then be
within the jurisdiction of the court.
The property being thus brought into the power of the court
and protected from dissipation, concealment, or further transfer,
the court should forthwith proceed to determine the issue.
If the claimant fails to answer within the time required and the
judge be satisfied from the evidence before him that the al-
leged transfer is void and that the seized property is subject to
the execution, he should enter a default against the claimant and
order the sheriff to sell the property to satisfy the execution.
But, if the claimant answers and asserts an adverse claim to the
property seized, the issue thus presented should be, on demand
of either party, submitted for the determination of a jury on
whose verdict an appropriate judgment may be entered and
execution issued, which judgment may be reviewed by writ of
error.14
Recapping briefly, the general procedure used in supplementary pro-
ceedings is as follows: The proceedings are commenced with the affidavit,
the defendant and other persons are examined as witnesses, and findings
of fact and conclusions of law are then made by the judge or a commis-
sioner appointed by him. Up to this point the procedure is fairly simple.
However, once property which would be subject to the judgment has
been located, the matter becomes more complicated. When property has
been located, one or several of the following things may occur: (1) If the
property is completely in the debtor's possession, the court may order
that it be executed upon; (2) If the property is in the hands of third
persons, and was not transferred by the debtor with the intent to hinder
or defraud his creditors, the third person must be impleaded, given an
opportunity to be heard, and then a final determination must be made
by the court as to whether the property should be made subject to the
judgment creditor's writ of execution; or (3) If the property is in the
hands of a third person who has been impleaded and allowed to be heard,
and there has been a prima facie showing by the judgment creditor that
the property was transferred by his debtor to hinder or defraud creditors,
the court may order the sheriff to levy upon the property prior to the final
determination as to whether it should be subject to the writ.
The foregoing general outline of the procedure used in supplementary
proceedings is, of course, subject to some exceptions. For instance, the
statute appears to be oriented more towards dealing with personal prop-
erty than with real property.
There is no provision in these sections for a procedure in refer-
134. Id. The procedure to be followed if the claimant answers is set out in detail in
FA. STAT. §§ 56.16-56.20 (1969).
197-1]
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ence to determining rights in real estate. The procedure in such
respect is different from that in reference to personal property,
as the statutes recognize. Instead of prescribing procedure in
reference to real estate, the broad power is given the judge [in
subsection 9] to prescribe what in his discretion may be the
proper procedure in reference to real estate .... All claimants to
the real estate must have a day in court. This is self-evident,
and it is incumbent upon the court, under the power here con-
ferred, to provide such procedure as will give all claimants in
interest in reference to real estate a hearing." 5
Another important factor pertaining to this general procedure is the
judgment creditor's right to a day in court. In Ferguson v. Goodley,88
the plaintiff in execution caused a rule nisi to be entered against the
judgment debtor's insurer ordering the insurer to show cause why a
judgment should not be entered against it. The insurer filed an affidavit
asserting that it had not insured the judgment debtor. Upon this ground
and several others, the insurer moved to quash the rule nisi. Although
the record was unclear, the trial court apparently dismissed the rule
nisi based upon an examination of the pleadings and affidavits. On appeal,
the judgment was reversed on the ground that the judgment creditor was
"not afforded adequate opportunity to present such evidence and testi-
mony as may be relevant to [his] claim. .... ,,"3T From the foregoing deci-
sion, it appears that all parties to supplementary proceedings must
be given the opportunity to be heard with respect to their claims to the
property sought to be applied to the judgment.
2. JURISDICTION
It seems clear that the procedural steps called for by the supplemen-
tary proceedings statutes are jurisdictional and must be complied with
in order to give the court the power to grant the relief requested. s18 De-
spite this fact, there is considerable uncertainty as to what constitutes
fulfillment of several of these steps. For instance, the order requiring the
defendant in execution to appear and be examined concerning his prop-
erty is required by subsection 3 of the current statute to "be served in a
reasonable time before the date of the examination in the manner pro-
vided for service of summons or may be served on such defendant or his
attorney as provided for service of papers in the rules of civil proce-
135. Florida Guar. Sec. v. McAllister, 47 F.2d 762, 765 (S.D. Fla. 1931). The section
referred to now provides "[tihat the court may enter any orders required to carry out the
purpose of this section to subject property or property rights of any defendant to execution."
FLA. STAT. § 56.29(9) (1969).
136. 213 So.2d 495 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
137. Id. at 497.
138. Cf. Tomayko v. Thomas, 143 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). In Tomayko, the
plaintiff in execution failed to file an affidavit and attempted to commence the proceedings
by a petition for a rule nisi. This procedure was held to be insufficient to confer jurisdiction
over the proceedings.
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dure."'139 This provision is substantially similar to the requirement set
out in the earlier statutes which required that the order "be served upon
the defendant at least fifteen days before the time set for such exami-
nation, and shall be served by the Sheriff in the same manner provided
for service of subpoena."' 40 The reader should note that the current
statute, as well as its predecessors, calls for service of the order upon the
defendant in execution, and this requirement is mandatory. Strict adher-
ence to this requirement is necessary even though the proceedings are sup-
plemental to the main cause. It is true that in a proceeding to modify
the alimony provisions of a divorce decree, which is by nature a pro-
ceeding supplemental to the original decree, the parties to the main
action are not again entitled to actual service of process but only to an
adequate and reasonable notice of the new proceedings.' 4 ' Be this as it
may, the rule in supplementary proceedings is not the same. Although pro-
ceedings supplemental to a divorce decree and proceedings supplementary
to execution are both collateral to the main cause and do not constitute
a separate action, they nevertheless differ in the respect that supple-
mentary proceedings in aid of execution are controlled by their own sep-
arate statute. The requirement of service upon the defendant in execu-
tion, even though he was a party to the previous action, is a statutory
requirement and must be adhered to in every case.
Another jurisdictional aspect of supplementary proceedings which
deserves mention at this point concerns itself with the various courts in
which the proceedings may be brought. Are supplementary proceedings
available in all the courts of this state, and, if so, is identical relief avail-
able in each court? At one time there was some authority to the effect that
supplementary proceedings were available only in the circuit courts of this
state. Today, however, there is no merit to this position. The civil court
of record, with respect to its own judgments, has full power to conduct
supplementary proceedings and implead third parties as may the cir-
cuit court with respect to its own judgments.142 Furthermore, the civil
court also has the power to appoint a commissioner as provided by the
statute.43 But although supplementary proceedings are available in the
civil court of record, the relief obtainable is not quite the same as that
which can be given by the circuit courts.
The Civil Court of Record ... is a statutory court. A limitation
upon the jurisdiction of the Civil Court of Record ... is pro-
vided by Article V, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of
Florida, ... which expressly states that the Circuit Courts shall
139. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(3) (1969).
140. FLA. STAT. J 55.53 (1963).
141. Carter v. Carter, 164 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
142. Brownstone, Inc. v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 165 So.2d 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
143. Id. This power is statutory and has nothing to do with the constitutional power
to appoint commissioners which is limited to the circuit courts. I.
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have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in equity and
'all actions involving the titles or boundaries of real estate,...1 44
In other words, the civil court of record has jurisdiction to entertain
supplementary proceedings but may neither enter any order involving
the title to real property145 nor grant any equitable relief.
Until recently, it was thought that the small claims court, created
by chapter 42 of the Florida Statutes, had no power to entertain sup-
plementary proceedings.140 Presently, however, the Attorney General
has taken the following position:
[I]t appears that the Judges of the Small Claims Courts, created
and operating under the provisions of Ch. 42, F. S., are em-
powered to entertain proceedings supplementary to its execution,
as provided for in Sections 55.52-55.611 F. S. however, all
actions that may be taken pursuant to the provisions of Sections
55.52-55.611, F. S., involving equitable matters, titles and
boundaries of real estate are exclusively matters within the Cir-
cuit Courts jurisdiction. 147
The federal district courts of this state also have jurisdiction to
entertain supplementary proceedings. At one point, this jurisdiction was
conferred by a federal statute which provided that the "party recover-
ing a judgment in any common-law cause in any district court, shall be
entitled to similar remedies upon the same, by execution or otherwise, to
reach the property of the judgment debtor, as are provided in like
causes by the laws of the state in which such court is held, .... M48 The
federal district courts are now authorized to institute the forum state's
supplementary proceedings by virtue of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 69.
3. APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSIONER
According to the current supplementary proceedings statute, "the
Court may refer the proceeding to a commissioner or master who may
be directed to report findings of law or fact, or both."'4 9 Although this
statute indicates that the court may make such an appointment at any
time, there appears to be some question as to when, if at all, such an ap-
144. Blackwelder v. D'Ercole Enterprises, Inc., 126 So.2d 598, 600 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961)
(interpreting the 1865 Constitution). The provisions of the 1968 Constitution are essentially
the same in this regard. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1968).
145. An action involving real property is one "where the necessary result of the decree
or judgment is that one party gains or the other loses an interest in the real estate, . . .
Barrs v. State ex rel. Britt, 95 Fla. 75, 80, 116 So. 28,-29 (1928). .
146. (1955-1956] FLA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 736.
147. [1965-19661 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 389, 390 (specifically overruling all
previous opinions in conflict therewith).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 727 (1926) in Florida Guar. Sec. Inc. v. McAllister, 47 F.2d 762, 764
(S.D. Fla. 1931). Section 727 has since been replaced by FED. R. Civ. P. 69.
149. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(7) (1969).
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pointment would become mandatory. It was fairly well settled that under
the former version of this statute, "[i] f the residence of the defendant is
in another county, the order of the judge shall name a commissioner 'in
that other county' . . . " The language of the earlier statutes pro-
vided quite plainly that if the defendant in execution resided in the
county in which the court was located, the court could, in its discretion,
hear the matter or appoint a commissioner for that purpose. On the
other hand, if the defendant in execution resided in another county, the
court was required to appoint a commissioner.' 5 ' It is suggested that
under the present version of this statute, the result will be exactly the
same. The relevant subsection provides that "the court shall require the
defendant in execution to appear before it or a commissioner or master
at a time and place specified by the order in the county of the defen-
dant's residence to be examined concerning his property."' 52 The man-
datory portion of the language is that the defendant shall only be made
to appear in the county of his residence. Thus, if the court is located in
another county, it must appoint a commissioner. Furthermore, there is
nothing in the language of the current statute which would operate to
prevent the court from appointing a commissioner even when the defen-
dant resides in the county wherein the court is located.
Each case, of course, will give rise to its own advantages and dis-
advantages with respect to the appointment of a commissioner. However,
this author recommends that the hearing be held before a judge whenever
possible.
The practice of appointing commissioners varies from place to
place. If possible, in the interests of economy and quicker results,
it is preferable to have the judge hear the matter.
As a practical matter, if a commissioner must be designated
or is in fact designated, it is well to have a date set before the
actual signing of the order, allowing sufficient time for service.
It is preferable for psychological effect to have the commissioner
use a courtroom so that the defendant in execution will be im-
pressed with the serious nature of the proceeding and the obli-
gation to tell the truth.153
In the event that a commissioner is used and the creditor is dissatisfied
150. State ex rel. All Florida Land Co. v. Thomas Manors, Inc., 136 Fla. 207, 210, 186
So. 421, 422 (1939).
151. [T]he plaintiff shall thereupon be entitled to have from the judge of said court
an order requiring the defendant or defendants in said execution to be and appear
in case the residence of defendant is in the county in which the court is located, be-
fore the judge of said court or some commissioner designated in said order, and in
case the residence of defendant is in another county, then before some commissioner
designated in said order in that other county, at a time and place specified in said
order and then and there to be examined concerning his property.
FLA. STAT. § 55.52 (1963).
152. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(2) (1969).
153. FLORIDA BAR CONTnUINo LEGAL EDUCATION Div., FLORIDA CivIL PRACTICE AFTrER
Tan J 3.27 (1969).
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with the results of the commissioner's report, the creditor may move the
court to set the report aside.1 5 4 Apparently, this is the proper procedure
for preserving error and the creditor may assign as error the denial
of the motion to set aside the commissioner's report.
4. POWERS OF THE COURT
Generally speaking, the power of the court entertaining supplemen-
tary proceedings is wide-ranging and amenable to a flexible application.
"The Court may enter any orders required to carry out the purpose of
this section to subject property or property rights of any defendant to
execution."'5 Of course, the court is limited, as always, by the Constitu-
tion and the concept of due process.
One important power is the ability to implead third persons and
make them a party to the supplementary proceedings whenever it ap-
pears that relief against them may be warranted. Unlike the statutes of
some other states, Florida's statute provides that "the judges have the
power, and it is their duty, to bring in and implead third parties when-
ever it appears relief against them may be warranted."'"" The details
surrounding the procedure for impleading third parties will be discussed
in a later section.
Contempt power is another important adjunct of supplementary
proceedings. In proceedings supplementary to execution, the court may
order the defendant, or any other person, to disclose the location of any
property which may legally be applied to the satisfaction of the judg-
ment. If the person so ordered refuses to comply, the court may have
him imprisoned until he purges himself of the contempt by complying
with the order. 157
In supplementary proceedings the court may not only seek out other
property, but may also "direct an inquiry into the corporate entity and
to make an order thereon in accordance with evidence submitted" as to
whether the corporate veil should be pierced and the individual stock-
holders made liable for the debts of the corporation. 5 This ability to
pierce the corporate veil is not specifically mentioned by the statute but
is part of the broad discretionary power conveyed thereby.
Under this generous umbrella of authority, it has been held that the
courts have the power in supplementary proceedings to adjudicate the
judgment debtor's rights under a liability insurance policy. An example
is General Guarantee Insurance Co. v. DaCosta,5 9 where the judgment
154. First Nat'l Bank v. Bebinger, 99 Fla. 1290, 128 So. 862 (1930).
155. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(9) (1969).
156. Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 743, 164 So. 836, 840 (1935).
157. Reese v. Baker, 98 Fla. 52, 123 So. 3 (1929). This power is expressly provided by
statute. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(10) (1969).
158. Riley v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769, 773 (Fla. 1950).
159. 190 So.2d 211 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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debtor's liability insurer was impleaded in the supplementary proceed-
ings. The insurer objected to being impleaded on the ground that the
judgment debtor's rights under the insurance policy were not property
rights but were choses in action not reachable through the procedure
being employed. This position was completely rejected by the third
district which held that the phrase "property rights," as used in the sup-
plementary proceedings statute, was broad enough to encompass the
debtor's rights under a liability insurance policy. Further, the court found
that even if these rights were to be characterized as choses in action,
supplementary proceedings are ordinarily the proper remedy for reach-
ing choses in action. This being the case, the district court of appeal
reasoned that the court had the power in such proceedings to adjudicate
the extent of the debtor's rights under the liability policy.
Because the language of the statute appears to convey such broad
discretionary power, one would be of the opinion that at least the circuit
courts, when entertaining supplementary proceedings, would be able
to grant equitable relief where it was necessary to protect the judgment
creditor's right to enforce his judgment. However, the only case dealing
with this subject which research has disclosed seems to hold to the con-
trary. In Street v. Sugerman,160 the trial court entered an order in a
supplementary proceeding enjoining the judgment debtors from secreting,
transferring, or hypothecating any assets belonging to a corporation in
which they owned stock. The corporation had never been a party to the
suit, but the stockholders were the judgment debtors in the main cause
and their stock in the corporation had already been made subject to a
levy of execution. In the supplementary proceedings, the judgment
creditors sought to protect the value of the stock levied upon by enjoin-
ing the debtors from transferring any of the property of the corporation
to third persons. On appeal to the third district, the court sua sponte
decided that the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue an injunc-
tion in a common law action, interfering with the assets of a corporation
and the rights of third party stockholders who were not parties to the
action.
Even though proceedings supplemental to execution may have
been commenced, it does not appear that there is any statutory
authority for a trial judge in a common law action to issue an
injunction of the nature involved herein. We have examined
the provisions of Ch. 55, Fla. Stat., and particularly § 55.60
Fla. Stat., F.S.A., relative to supplemental proceedings and it
appears that, although the trial judge would have the authority
to 'subject any property or property rights of any defendant to
the satisfaction of any execution against him.', this was not the
purported purpose of the order in the instant case.16'
160. 177 So.2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
161. Id. at 527.
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A careful analysis of this decision leaves the reader with several ques-
tions. Was the holding really based upon the fact that the statute did
not confer to the court entertaining supplementary proceedings the
power to issue an injunction? Or was the holding based upon the fact
that some of the stockholders of the corporation who were affected by
the injunction were not parties to the original suit or the supplemental
proceedings? It is suggested that the latter reason would provide a
sounder basis for denying the relief requested in the Street case. No
reading of the current statute will support the position that there is an
implied prohibition against the use of equitable power in supplementary
proceedings. In fact, if an implication exists, it is the contrary. As to
the apparent emphasis placed by the court upon the fact that the under-
lying cause was a legal action, this writer fails to see any significance in
that point in the light of the merger of law and equity. In any event, the
Street case seems to represent the only significant restriction upon the
powers exercisable in proceedings supplementary to execution.
5. IMPLEADING THIRD PARTIES
When seeking the satisfaction of a judgment through the process
of supplementary proceedings it is important to note that the court in such
proceedings cannot adjudicate the rights of third persons until they have
been fully impleaded and properly made a party to the supplementary
proceedings. The cases are legion wherein the judgment creditor has pro-
ceeded to a final adjudication with respect to certain property only to have
his judgment reversed on appeal because a person or persons claiming an
interest in that property were not joined as party defendants in the
action. "2
If during the course of proceedings supplementary to execution
the rights of third parties claiming adversely both to plaintiff
in execution as well as to defendant in execution appear to be
involved, no rights of such third parties should be adjudged to
be affected, impaired, or finally cut off by any order of court
made in such proceedings supplementary to execution, unless
such third parties have been first fully impleaded and brought
into the case as actual parties to the proceeding, and, as such,
given an opportunity to fully and fairly present their claims as
parties entitled to a full and fair hearing after the making up
of definite issues to be tried, and not as mere spectators or by-
standers in the cause."6
"[T]he statutes are silent on the procedure for bringing in third parties
162. See, e.g., Ryan's Furniture Exch. Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 162 So. 483 (1935);
Shanjim Publications, Inc. v. Haft, 179 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); Crawford v. United
States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 139 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
163. Ryan's Furniture Exch. Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 120, 162 So. 483, 487 (1935).
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in order to protect their interest."'1 64 However, the decisions -seem to
indicate that there are several different methods available for impleading
third persons. One method is
by the service of an appropriate rule nisi upon them requiring
them to appear and show cause why their asserted claims to
disputed assets in their hands, possession or control should not
be inquired into and held to be voidable as to the plaintiff in
execution who is seeking to reach such disputed assets in order
to satisfy his judgment against his judgment debtor whose assets
he claims they in reality are.'6 5
Other possible methods would be the third parties' voluntary inter-
vention to protect their interests or service upon them of the original
affidavit. Of course, the bulk of the problems and confusion have cen-
tered around the rule nisi or a rule to show cause as it is sometimes
called.
The rule nisi is not an order requiring third parties to pay the judg-
ment or suffer being held in contempt. On the contrary,
[t]he construction to be placed on the order is that it presents
prima facie findings against the respondents which they are
required to answer and upon the allegations of which issues may
be made up for the jury trial, if jury be demanded by either
party, or that in default of issues being made by the pleadings
default judgment may be entered and execution issued, which
judgment may be reviewed on writ of error.' 66
In other words, the rule nisi orders the defendant to submit himself to
the jurisdiction of the court and to show cause why certain of his prop-
erty should not be applied to the judgment creditor's judgment. Upon
his appearance in the cause, he becomes a party thereto and the court
can then, on the basis of his answer, frame the issues of law and fact to
be decided in the case.
It is important to note that the issuance of the order impleading third
parties is not merely procedural. By this it is meant that the order should
not issue unless the judgment creditor has made a prima facie showing
that the third person has property which should be applied to the satis-
faction of the judgment creditor's writ of execution.16 7 If this require-
ment were not made, every judgment which remained unsatisfied could
result in a fishing expedition by the creditor who is casting wildly about
in the hopes of finding some assets belonging to his debtor. More than a
mere hunch is required for the issuance of the rule to show cause.
. The need for impleading is, of course, a result of the requirement of
164. FLORMA BAR CONnTiNUm LEGAL EDUCATION Div., FLORIDA CIVIL PRAcTIcE AFTER
TRIAL § 3.30 (1966).
165. Ryan's Furniture Exch. Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 120, 162 So. 483, 488 (1935).
166. State ex rel. Phoenix Tax Title Corp. v. Viney, 120 Fla. 657, 665-66, 163 So. 57,
61 (1935).
167. Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Indus. Inc., .84 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
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due process. No person should have his property rights affected without
a chance to be heard. In this connection, it might be added that the form
of the rule to show cause must be sufficient to put the third person on
notice as to the nature of the proposed proceedings. It is not sufficient
that the third party merely be impleaded by the order to show cause,
for the order must identify the scope of the examination and the exact
nature of what is being sought. In the case of Meyer v. Faust,0 8 the
order involved gave notice only of a proposed examination concerning
the property of the defendant. The court held this language was not
broad enough to "contemplate an inquiry of the scope necessary to an
adjudication of adverse interests . . . ."I" In other words, the order did
not put the third person on notice that the judgment creditor was seeking
to have transfers to the third person declared fraudulent. The lesson to
be learned is that the party seeking to implead a third person should
see to it that the order to show cause specifically identifies the exact
nature of the inquiry 70
Another method of compelling a third person to become a party to
the action, which has been hinted at in the cases, is through service of
the affidavit. Presumably, if the affidavit names the third person as a
party defendant and is served on him, that person will then become a
party to the supplementary proceedings.17 '
With reference to the question of who may be impleaded, the only
limitation appears to be the above-mentioned prima facie showing that
the third person may have property which should lawfully be subjected
to the creditor's judgment. It is now well settled in this state that even
the judgment creditor's liability insurer may be impleaded into the sup-
plementary proceedings.17 2 Probably the only significant problem in this
area is who is to be impleaded when the third person is a dissolved cor-
poration. In Scott v. Harrison,7 3 the court held that in such a situation
it may order any person to appear.
6. EXAMINATION AND EVIDENCE
Rules governing the procedure for examination are another aspect
of these proceedings which deserve special mention. As the previous
section indicated, only parties to the proceedings can be bound by thejudgment. However, nothing prevents either party from causing any
168. 83 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1955).
169. Id. at 848.
170. An excellent form for the Rule to Show Cause appears in FLORIDA BAR CONTInnG
EDUCATION Div., FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE AiTER TRIAL § 3.34 (1966).
171. Ci. Kornberg v. Krupka, 118 So.2d 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
172. General Guar. Ins. Co. v. DaCosta, 190 So.2d 211 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
173. 134 Fla. 696, 184 So. 233 (1938). According to the court, although the statute
requires a corporation to appear and answer by an officer, if no such officer exists, the court
can compel a trustee, receiver, or any other person to attend on behalf of the dissolved
corporation.
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person to be subpoenaed and subject to the examination. Even where the
proceedings are conducted before a commissioner or master, he has the
power to issue a subpoena compelling any person to testify.174
A matter giving rise to some question in this area has been the scope
of the examination itself. The statute prescribes a liberal rule and pro-
vides for a comprehensive examination.
So long as the examination is directed to matters affecting the
business or financial interests of the defendant, what property
he has, his rights thereon, and the location thereof, whether
within or without the State, the examination is pertinent and
competent. The purpose of the statute is to aid judgment credi-
tors in securing information that would lead to the satisfaction,
in whole or in part, of any execution held by them. Any infor-
mation which tends directly or indirectly to do this must be
given.175
Of course, there must be a limit to the examination. It has been held
that the proceedings
cannot be employed as a predicate to pry into a judgment
debtor's private affairs in the absence of reasonable or well
founded belief of concealment or fraudulent transfer of prop-
erty, nor can it be used to uncover the personal affairs or rela-
tions of unfortunate debtors in search of some clue leading to
the information desired. 176
But beyond this limitation, the examination may take any reasonable
course.
The foregoing language provides a general guide for what consti-
tutes admissible evidence in these proceedings. If the evidence sought
to be admitted takes the form of a document or similar object, the test
is whether "the plaintiff has made a reasonable showing that the docu-
ment is likely to" show what property the defendant has. 177
One other point with respect to evidence which is worthy of special
note relates to depositions taken in aid of execution. It will be recalled
that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.560 provides that a judgment
creditor may conduct depositions in aid of execution. This procedure
supplements, but does not supplant, the remedy provided by supplemen-
tary proceedings and may be used in conjunction therewith. It has been
held that testimony taken at such a deposition is admissible in supple-
mentary proceedings even when the person against whom it is being
admitted was not a party to the supplemental proceedings at the time
the deposition was taken. 78
174. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(7) (1969).
175. Reese v. Baker, 98 Fla. 52, 55, 123 So. 3, 4 (1929).
176. Id.
177. Keystone Trust Co. v. Rockefeller, 118 So.2d 604, 607 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960). Here
the document held to be admissible was a partnership agreement.
178. Hanisch v. Wilder, 210 So.2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), holding that the admission
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7. LEVY UPON THE PROPERTY
Once these proceedings have been pursued to a final judgment
against either the judgment debtor himself or some third person, the
creditor may then levy execution pursuant to that judgment. But the
statute is silent as to whether there is a need for the issuance of a new
writ of execution or whether the old writ may again be issued to the
sheriff for the purposes of levy and sale. Probably the better practice is
to have a new writ of execution issued upon the judgment rendered in
the supplementary proceedings. However, there is authority to the effect
that "a premature return by way of endorsement 'nulla bona' on the
execution is not necessarily such a final return of the execution as works
its dissolution."'1 79 In Ryan's Furniture Exchange Inc. v. McNair,80 the
final order in the supplementary proceedings required the clerk of the
circuit court to deliver to the sheriff the execution which had originally
been returned to the court unsatisfied and had formed the foundation
for the supplementary proceedings. On appeal, it was argued that this
order was not provided for by the statutes and was therefore erroneous.
The Florida Supreme Court held that the writ had not been finally re-
turned; therefore new execution was unnecessary. Thus, it appears that
upon the rendition of final judgment in the supplementary proceedings,
the creditor may sue out a writ of execution upon the new judgment or,
if the order so provides, have the sheriff levy pursuant to the original writ.
Another uncertain area surrounding the concept of levy pursuant to
supplementary proceedings relates to the time at which such a levy may
be made. In the previous paragraph, the discussion was with reference
to levy after the final judgment in the supplemental proceedings. Such a
levy is probably the most typical in relation to these proceedings. But
it is possible, in certain cases, to have the sheriff levy upon the property
prior to the final judgment in the supplementary proceedings. The
provision for such a procedure is found in Florida Statute section
56.29(6)(b)(1969) which provides that:
When any gift, transfer, assignment or other conveyance of per-
sonal property has been made or contrived by defendant to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors, the court shall order the
gift, transfer, assignment or other conveyance to be void and
direct the sheriff to take the property to satisfy the execution.
It will be recalled from an earlier section"8' that this procedure may be
employed only when the person receiving the transfer has already been
made a party, has been allowed to present his evidence, and a prima
of such a deposition in no way violates the rule in Brown v. Tanner, 164 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1964).
179. Ryan's Furniture Exch. Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 119, 162 So. 483, 487 (1935).
180. Id.
181. See p. 622 supra.
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facie showing has been made by the judgment creditor that the transfer
was for the purpose of defrauding creditors. Apparently the statute does
not apply to all fraudulent transfers and is only applicable to those
wherein the transferor actually intended to defraud his creditors. In
this particular situation, and only after the transferee has been properly
impleaded and there has been a prima facie showing that the transfer
was fraudulent, the court may order the sheriff to immediately levy upon
the property in the hands of the third person.
[T] hereafter 'any person who may be aggrieved thereby may file
claim and bond as provided in other cases where third persons
claim property taken under levy.... This procedure in reference
to personal property is certainly proper because such property
may be wasted, lost, or concealed, and therefore the trial of
title concerning the same is fixed after possession is taken by
the sheriff. All parties in interest have their day in court there-
fore, fixed by the statute, and the court proceeds to try title
under these proceedings supplemental to execution to this per-
sonal property and to decree whether the same is the property
of the judgment debtor and subject to levy under execution to
satisfy the judgment. 82
The claim and bond procedure mentioned in the above quotation is now
provided for by Florida Statute sections 56.16-56.20 (1969). When
this procedure is invoked by the person whose property is levied upon
by the sheriff, he may file an affidavit with the sheriff and post a bond
equal to double the value of the property and thereby regain possession
of the property immediately. In all such cases, a jury trial is had on the
question of the right to possession of the property unless it is waived.
In summary, levy is normally carried out only at the conclusion of
the supplementary proceedings but, in the special case of a prima facie
showing of an intentionally fraudulent transfer, levy may be had prior
to the final judgment in the proceedings.
8. FEES AND COSTS
In 1963, the statutes pertaining to supplementary proceedings were
amended to provide for the taxing of costs. The rule is simply that all
costs pertaining to the proceedings as well as other reasonable incidental
costs (not limited to docketing the execution, the sheriff's returns and
service fees, and the court reporter's fees) will be taxed to the defen-
dant in execution."8 ' But it has been held that attorneys' fees are not
"costs" within the meaning of the statute. 84 Therefore, the general rule
182. Florida Guar. Sec. Inc. v. McAllister, 47 F.2d 762, 764 (S.D. Fla. 1931).
183. FiA. STAT. § 56.29(11) (1969).
184. Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1956). In this case, the promissory note
sued upon in the main cause provided for attorney's fees but the court stated that the pro-
vision could have no effect upon impleaded parties who were not privy to the note itself.
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is that in supplementary proceedings it would be improper for the court
to award attorneys' fees to the creditor as against either the debtor or
impleaded third parties. 18 5
D. Rights of Third Parties
Probably the most important right afforded to third persons in
these proceedings is the opportunity to present their claims, as parties,
on the issues involved including questions as to whether conveyances of
property of the judgment debtor are avoidable as to them. This has
been fully discussed in earlier sections and needs no further mention at
this point. It is sufficient to say that in all cases third persons are en-
titled to all the guarantees of procedural due process.
Does an impleaded third party have a right to trial by jury in
supplemental proceedings? According to one authority, the answer to
this question is yes. The position taken is that "[t]here is no statutory
right to a jury; the right results from the due process provisions estab-
lished by Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. 836 (1936) and
Ryan's Furniture Exchange v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 162 So. 483
(1935). ' '18G Perhaps this conclusion is entirely correct, but the case law
cited in support thereof does not necessarily reach such a holding. The
principle case, Ryan's Furniture Exchange v. McNair, involved a situ-
ation wherein the judgment creditor, at the hearings before the com-
missioner, had made out a prima facie showing that the property had
been transferred by the debtor with the intent to defraud his creditors.
The commissioner made findings of fact and law to this effect, and the
findings were approved by the circuit court. The circuit court eventually
issued an order to the sheriff to levy upon the property held by the third
person transferee. On certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, the
action of the trial court was reversed because this order had been en-
tered without first impleading the third person and giving him an oppor-
tunity to state his case. The Supreme Court went on to state
that the ordinary right to a jury trial of issues of fact developed
in such a case should not be denied, where a third party sets up
bona fide such claim to disputed assets in his hands, possession
or control, that his rights thereto could only be properly asserted
and adjudicated against him in a statutory claim proceeding. 187
The statutory claim proceeding referred to in the Ryan case pro-
vides for a statutory right to a jury trial. According to the facts of the
case, there was a prima facie showing that the defendant had intention-
ally transferred his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors.
185. Schwartz v. Sherman, 210 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
186. FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION Div., FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE AFTER
TRIAL § 3.31 (1966).
187. Ryan's Furniture Exch. Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 121, 162 So. 483, 488 (1935)
(emphasis added).
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This placed the Ryan case squarely within the ambit of what is now
subsection 6(b) of the supplementary proceedings statute which pro-
vides that any person aggrieved by a levy made pursuant to that sub-
section may file for a claim and bond proceedings which affords to him
a statutory right to a jury trial. This writer does not conclude that the
constitutional right to a jury trial is absent in supplementary proceed-
ings, regardless of the claim of the judgment creditor; rather, it is sug-
gested that the decisions leave the question moot.
A fairly recent decision tends to imply that the right to trial by
jury in supplementary proceedings is a statutory right, and therefore,
limited. In Dezen v. Slatcoff,18s the plaintiff in execution impleaded the
third party defendant and proceeded to make out a prima facie show-
ing that the third party had received property transferred with the intent
to defraud creditors. On this basis, the trial court ordered the sheriff to
levy upon the property. On appeal, the third party argued that this pro-
cedure violated her constitutional right to trial by jury. This argument
was rebuffed by the court for several reasons.
There is no merit to the contention of the appellant that her
constitutional rights were invaded because she did not have a
jury trial .... In the first place, this was a summary proceeding
especially authorized by law and limited as above set forth, and
no trial by jury was required.5 9
As another basis for the ruling, the court pointed out that if the third
party was aggrieved by the action and wished to contest the findings
and order of the circuit judge, she could do so by filling a claim and
bond and proceed as in those cases where a third person claims property
taken under levy. This would give the third party a right to trial by
jury, a statutory right.
Another substantial right of third persons with respect to these
proceedings is to interplead into the supplementary proceeding when
they are a stakeholder of a fund owed to the principal debtor. A third
party holding a fund which is owed to the principal debtor in supple-
mentary proceedings may make an application to intervene pursuant to
Rule 1.240 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and deposit the fund
into the court registry."'
E. Property Subject to Supplementary Proceedings
Both real and personal property may be made subject to proceed-
ings supplementary to execution. 9' It is immaterial whether the prop-
188. 66 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1953).
189. Id. at 485. See also Brownstone, Inc. v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 165 So.2d 262 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964).
190.. Carter v. Carter, 164 So.2d 219.(Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
191. Florida Guar. Sec. Inc. v. McAllister, 47 F.2d 762 (S.D. Fla. 1931).
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erty is located within or without the state, because the proceedings
operate in personam and the court may always enforce its judgment against
the person of the defendant by way of its contempt power.1 92
Property which has been the subject of a fraudulent transfer is, of
course, reachable through supplementary proceedings because the court
has the power to void the transfer. 19 3 Furthermore, so long as the trans-
fer is by some rule fraudulent, it may be voided in supplemental pro-
ceedings even if it was not made specifically with the intent to defraud
creditors within the meaning of subsection 6(b). An example of such a
transfer might be a bulk sale' or a sale and a temporary retention of
possession. 195 With respect to fraudulent transfers, it is important to
note that subsection 6(a) does not operate to exempt fraudulent trans-
fers made more than one year prior to the rendition of judgment in the
main cause. It only operates to shift the burden of proof from the
plaintiff to the defendant in execution if the transfer was actually made
within one year of the judgment. 9
In conclusion, the property subject to supplementary proceedings
includes virtually all property rights of the defendant in execution in-
cluding such interests as choses in action and rights under a liability
insurance policy. 9 7
F. Statute of Limitations
The time limitations placed upon the commencement of supple-
mentary proceedings are relatively simple once it is understood that the
maximum limitation is not placed upon the commencement but upon the
completion of the proceedings. In Young v. McKenzie, 98 the plaintiff in
execution revived his dormant judgment with a writ of scire facias prior to
the time the 20-year statute of limitations on judgments had run. The ex-
ecution was issued, returned nulla bona, and the plaintiff commenced sup-
plementary proceedings. After the issuance of the rule nisi and the im-
pleading of a third party defendant, the 20-year period from the rendition
of the final judgment in the main cause finally expired. According to the
Florida Supreme Court, the defendant in execution had the right to have
the rule nisi quashed after the running of the 20-year period. Supplemen-
tary proceedings cannot be used to search out property after the twentieth
year because to do so is futile. Florida Statute section 95.11 (1) (1969)
provides that an action upon a judgment must be made within twenty years
and Florida Statute section 56.021 (1969) says that execution is only
192. Reese v. Baker, 98 Fla. 52, 123 So. 3 (1929).
193. Licata v. Acolite Sign Co., 183 So.2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
194. See FLA. STAT. ch. 676 (1969).
195. See McKibbin v. Martin, 64 Pa. 352 (1870).
196. Swartz v. Lipsky, 241 So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
197. General Guar. Ins. Co. v. DaCosta, 190 So.2d 211 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
198. 46 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1950), noted in 4 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 96 (1951). See also 19
FLA. Juit. Judgments J§ 513-514 (1958) relating to time limitations and. revival.
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good during the lifetime of the judgment. Therefore, if the supplementary
proceedings are not completed during the life of the judgment, there is no
point in finishing them because a valid execution could not be issued upon
the underlying judgment which had since expired. The upshot of the
Young case is that the institution of supplementary proceedings does not
toll the running of the statute of limitations on the main cause. If the
statute runs while the proceedings are still in process, there is no longer
a valid and outstanding execution upon which the supplementary pro-
ceedings may be based for the execution lives only for the life of the
judgment.
Another point to be discussed with respect to time periods is the
question of dormancy which was mentioned earlier in this article.'99 The
reader should remember that there is still a possibility that judgments be-
come dormant in Florida and need to be revived.
G. Right to Review
As early as 1930, the Florida Supreme Court dealt with the question
of whether the final order in proceedings supplementary to execution was
one which could be appealed.
While the question is new with us, and the authorities are in
some conflict, we are of the opinion that the judge's final order or
judgment, rendered at the conclusion of such special proceedings,
adjudicating the question as to whether certain property is or is
not subject to be applied to the satisfaction of the plaintiff's
judgment and execution, is so far final and conclusive in its
nature as to constitute a final judgment to which writ of error
will lie,... and that it may be deemed to have been rendered in
a 'case' within the meaning of Section 5 of Article V of the
Constitution.20 0
The general rule appears to be that any person actually made a party
to the supplementary proceedings may appeal the final judgment
thereof.20' Of course, the party appealing must show that the order en-
tered in the supplementary proceedings was adverse to him.20 2
As to the weight given to findings of fact and conclusions of law
made by the trial court in supplementary proceedings, the appellate court
is required to follow the rules applied in the appeal of an ordinary case.
Once the court approves the commissioner's findings of fact and law
these findings are also accorded their usual weight upon appeal.203
199. See p. 600 supra.
200. First Nat'l Bank v. Bebinger, 99 Fla. 1290, 1293, 128 So. 862, 863 (1930) ; accord,
Orange Belt Packing Co. v. International Agricultural Corp., 112 Fla. 99, 150 So. 264 (1933).
201. Ryan's Furniture Exch., Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 162 So. 483 (1935); State
ex rel. Phoenix Tax Title Corp. v. Viney, 120 Fla. 657, 163 So. 57 (1935).
202. Shanjim Publications, Inc. v. Haft, 179 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
203. Stengel v. Biggar, 129 Fla. 627, 176 So. 786 (1937).
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Aside from the right of review pursuant to a writ of error (appeal),
the use of other writs of review in supplementary proceedings is highly
limited. In Saffran v. Adler, 04 the supreme court held that since the final
order issued in a supplementary proceeding is treated as a final judgment
and is appealable by a writ of error, there can be no review of the judg-
ment by common law certiorari. On the other hand, a writ of prohibition
to the district court is the proper remedy to restrain the execution of a
circuit judge's order adjudicating the rights of a third party who is not
properly impleaded into the supplementary proceedings. °5 To be entitled
to this remedy, however, the facts which show that the court below lacked
jurisdiction over the third party must be undisputed.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the purposes sought to be accomplished by this article is a
critical evaluation of the current supplementay proceedings statute. In
the preceding sections, the operation of the remedy was analyzed and
conclusions were reached with respect to the procedure to be used and
the relief available. From the outset, it became apparent that supple-
mentary proceedings should provide the judgment creditor with a highly
efficient collection device for reaching virtually all of the debtor's assets
subject to execution. However, it also became clear, as the various aspects
of the remedy were examined, that there are several ambiguities and un-
certainties concerning both the procedure to be followed and the rights
of the parties. It remains now to sum up the more serious trouble spots
and recommend to the legislature those changes which might be needed.
At the threshold is the problem concerning the dormancy of judg-
ments. Our statutes should specifically indicate whether the common-law
rule of dormancy has been eliminated.
Turning to the supplementary proceedings statute, several changes
are necessary. The statute should clearly state that a remedy at law was
intended. In this connection, reference should be made to the fact that
there is no need for the judgment creditor to exhaust his other legal reme-
dies. The right to a jury trial should be clearly spelled out as to each
phase of the proceedings. There needs to be a statement in the statute
which informs the judgment creditor that he must commence the pro-
ceedings in the court rendering the judgment in the main cause, assuming
this to be the legislative intent. A statement should be inserted indicating
who may make the affidavit; the attorney, the plaintiff's agent, or only
the plaintiff. Much clarification is needed concerning the time at which
levy is permitted. The section providing for levy in advance of a final
determination is thoroughly confusing. Finally, it is suggested that the
204. 152 Fla. 405, 12 So.2d 124 (1943).
205. State ex rel. O'Dare v. Kehoe, 189 So.2d 268 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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need for, and methods of, impleading third parties be clearly explained in
the statute.
Perhaps those who are inclined to resist any of the above amend-
ments base their position upon the fact that the answers to the questions
sought to be resolved are to be found in the case law. But even if this posi-
tion were sound, and it is doubtful that it is, how can the statute purport
to provide a "salutory and expeditious" remedy when the judgment credi-
tor must wade through volumes of reporters to determine such simple
matters as where and when to file what?
